In this paper, we first address adverse effects of cyber-physical attacks on distributed synchronization of multiagent systems, by providing necessary and sufficient conditions under which an attacker can destabilize the underlying network, as well as another set of necessary and sufficient conditions under which local neighborhood tracking errors of intact agents converge to zero. Based on this analysis, we propose a Kullback-Liebler divergence based criterion in view of which each agent detects its neighbors' misbehavior and, consequently, forms a selfbelief about the trustworthiness of the information it receives. Agents continuously update their self-beliefs and communicate them with their neighbors to inform them of the significance of their outgoing information. Moreover, if the self-belief of an agent is low, it forms trust on its neighbors. Agents incorporate their neighbors' self-beliefs and their own trust values on their control protocols to slow down and mitigate attacks. We show that using the proposed resilient approach, an agent discards the information it receives from a neighbor only if its neighbor is compromised, and not solely based on the discrepancy among neighbors' information, which might be caused by legitimate changes, and not attacks. The proposed approach is guaranteed to work under mild connectivity assumptions.
I. Introduction
The term cyber-physical system (CPS) refers to a relatively new generation of systems that integrate the cyber aspect of computation and communication with physical processes. Depending on the control objectives, CPSs can be categorized into two classes. In the first class, called single-agent networked control systems (NCSs), the CPS is a single but large-scale distributed system, wherein sensors, actuators, and controllers are distributed across the system, and centrally controlled control loops are closed over a real-time communication network [1] - [4] . The global objective in a NCS is generally to assure that the output of the system tracks a desired trajectory. In the second class, called multi-agent CPS, the CPS is comprised of a set of dynamical systems or agents that interact with each other over a communication network to achieve coordinated operation and behavior [5] - [8] . Despite their numerous applications in a variety of disciplines, CPSs are vulnerable to attacks, which is the main drawback in their wide deployment. In contrast to other undesirable inputs, such as disturbances and noises, cyber-physical attacks are intentionally planned to maximize the damage to the overall system or even destabilize it.
There has been extensive research progress in developing attack detection/identification and mitigation approaches for both single-agent NCSs [9] - [16] and multi-agent CPSs [17] - [29] . Despite tremendous and welcoming progress, most of the mentioned mitigation approaches for multi-agent CPSs use the discrepancy among agents and their neighbors to detect and mitigate the effect of an attack. However, as shown in this paper, a stealthy attack can make all agents become unstable simultaneously, and thus misguide existing mitigation approaches. Moreover, this discrepancy could be caused by a legitimate change in the state of an agent, and rejecting this useful information can decrease the speed of convergence to the desired consensus and harm connectivity of the network.
In this paper, we present attack analysis, detection, and mitigation mechanisms for distributed multi-agent CPSs with linear structures. We show that local neighborhood tracking errors of intact agents converge to zero, regardless of the attack, if and only if the eigenvalues of the attacker signal generator dynamics matrix are a subset of the eigenvalues of the consensus dynamics matrix. We call these types of attacks internal model principle (IMP)-based attacks. In spite of convergence to zero of local neighborhood tracking errors, the overall network could be destabilized, and we provide necessary and sufficient conditions for this. We then develop attack detectors that identify both IMP-based and non-IMPbased attacks. To detect IMP-based attacks, two local error sequences with folded Gaussian distributions are introduced based on the relative information of the agents. We show that they diverge under an IMP-based attack. A Kullback-Liebler (KL) divergence criterion is then introduced to measure the divergence between these two univariate folded Gaussian distributions, and consequently capture IMP-based attacks. Similarly, since non-IMP based attacks change the statistical properties of the local neighborhood tracking error, to detect non-IMP-based attacks, the KL divergence is employed to measure the discrepancy between the Gaussian distributions of the actual and nominal expected local neighborhood tracking errors. Then, a self-belief value, as an indication of the probability of presence of attacks on neighbors of an agent, is presented for each agent by combining these two KL-based detectors. The self-belief indicates the level of trustworthiness of the agent's own outgoing information, and is transmitted to its neighbors. Furthermore, when the self-belief of an agent is low, the trustworthiness of its incoming information from its neighbors is estimated using a particular notion of trust. Trust for each individual neighbor is developed based on the relative entropy between each individual neighbor's information and its own information. Finally, by incorporating neighbor's self-belief and trust values, we propose modified weighted control protocols to ensure mitigation of both types of attacks. Simulation results validate the effectiveness of the presented resilient approach.
II. PRELIMINARIES
A directed graph (digraph) G consists of a pair (V, E) in which V = {v 1 , · · · , v N } is a set of nodes and E ⊆ V × V is a set of edges. We denote the directed link (edge) from v j to v i by the ordered pair (v j , v i ). The adjacency matrix is defined as A = [a i j ], with a i j > 0 if (v j , v i ) ∈ E, and a i j = 0 otherwise. The nodes in the set N i = {v j : (v j , v i ) ∈ E} are said to be neighbors of node ν i . The graph Laplacian matrix is defined as
A node is called as a root node if it can reach all other nodes of the digraph G through a directed path. A leader is a root node with no incoming link. A (directed) tree is a connected digraph where every node except one, called the root, has indegree equal to one. A spanning tree of a digraph is a directed tree formed by graph edges that connects all the nodes of the graph. If the topology of the graph changes over time, e.g., links are added or removed, then we write the time-varying graph as G = (V, E(t)) with E(t) ⊆ V × V representing the set of time-varying edges.
Throughout the paper, we denote the set of integers by Z. The set of integers greater than or equal to some integer q ∈ Z is denoted Z q . The cardinality of a set S is denoted by |S |. λ(A) and tr(A) denote, respectively, the eigenvalues and trace of the matrix A. The Kronecker product of matrices A and B is denoted by A ⊗ B, and diag (A 1 , . . . , A n ) represents a block diagonal matrix with matrices A i , i = 1, . . . , N as its diagonal entries. 1 N is the N-vector of ones and I N is the N × N identity matrix. Im(R) and ker(R) represent, respectively, the range space and the null space of R, and span(a 1 , . . . , a n ) is the set of all linear combinations of the vectors a 1 , . . . , a n . A Gaussian distribution with mean µ and covariance Σ is denoted by N (µ, Σ). Moreover, F N μ,σ 2 represents univariate folded Gaussian distribution withμ andσ 2 as mean and variance, respectively [30] . E[.] denotes the expectation operator. Assumption 1. The communication graph G is directed and has a spanning tree.
Definition 1 (Intact Agent). Agents that are not directly under attack are called intact agents.
Definition 2 (Compromised Agent). Agents that are directly under attack are called compromised agents.
Definition 3 [31] . A square matrix A ∈ R n×n is called a singular M-matrix, if all its off-diagonal elements are non-positive and all eigenvalues of A have non-negative real parts.
Definition 4 [31] . A square matrix A ∈ R n×n is called a nonsingular M-matrix, if all its off-diagonal elements are nonpositive and all eigenvalues of A have positive real parts.
Definition 5 (r-reachable set) [32] . Given a directed graph G and a nonempty subset
Definition 6 (r-robust graph) [32] . A directed graph G is called an r-robust graph with r ∈ Z 0 if for every pair of nonempty, disjoint subsets of V, at least one of the subsets is r-reachable.
Lemma 1 [31] . The graph Laplacian matrix L of a directed graph G has at least one zero eigenvalue and all nonzero eigenvalues have positive real parts. Zero is a simple eigenvalue of L, if and only if Assumption 1 is satisfied.
III. PROBLEM FORMULATION
In this section, the output synchronization problem for multi-agent CPSs is presented. Both leader-follower and leaderless multi-agent systems are considered.
Consider a group of N linear heterogeneous agents with dynamics described by
where x i ∈ R n i , u i ∈ R m i and y i ∈ R p denote, respectively, the state, the control input and the output of agent i. The matrices A i ∈ R n i ×n i , B i ∈ R n i ×m i and C i ∈ R p×n i are, respectively, the drift dynamics, the input matrix and the output matrix. The pair (A i , B i ) is assumed to be stabilizable and the pair (A i , C i ) is assumed to be observable, ∀ i = 1, . . . , N. Assume now that the consensus trajectory is generated by
where x c ∈ R q and y c ∈ R p are, respectively, the state and output of the desired consensus trajectory. Moreover, S ∈ R q×q and R ∈ R p×q denote, respectively, the drift and the output matrices of the consensus dynamics. The pair (S , R) is assumed to be observable.
Assumption 2. The consensus dynamics matrix S is marginally stable and is known to all the agents.
Remark 1. Note that if S is Hurwitz, the synchronization problem has a trivial solution and can be solved by making the dynamics of each agent stable independently. Moreover, stable eigenvalues of S , if there are any, can be ignored by reducing the dimension of S , because they only contribute to the transient response of the consensus trajectories [33] . Note also that it is a standard assumption that the consensus dynamics S in (2) is known to all agents [34] . For example, in case of frequency synchronization in power networks [35] and velocity synchronization in a group of robots [6] , it is known to all agents that the desired trajectory is a constant, i.e., S = 0, but the consensus value is not known to all agents. As another example, in case of synchronization of oscillators [36] , all that is known to all agents is that the desired trajectory is sinusoidal, but its amplitude is not known to them.
Remark 2. In the case of leader-follower multi-agent systems, the consensus dynamics (2) is in fact the leader dynamics, which generates the desired consensus trajectory. The leader is only pinned to a small subset of agents and thus not all agents have direct access to the state or output of the leader.
In the case of the leaderless multi-agent CPSs, the agents communicate through a directed graph to reach a common value of interest, which is not known to any of the agents a priori and depends on the initial state of the root nodes. We now formulate the problem of output synchronization of multi-agent CPSs. To this end, the output synchronization error is defined as
with y i defined in (1) and y c defined in (2) .
Problem 1 (Output Synchronization). Consider the multiagent CPS (1) with the consensus dynamics (2) . Design a local control protocol u i in (1) such that
To demonstrate the broadness of our analysis, a general control protocol is considered for solving Problem 1, given asζ
where ζ i is the internal state of the dynamic controller, S is the consensus dynamics defined in (2), and K i , Γ i and µ are design matrices with appropriate dimensions. Moreover, η i denotes the local neighborhood tracking error given by
with h j as the data exchanged among agents (e.g. the internal state of agents [34] , the actual state [37] or the output [38] , [39] of agents).
Remark 3. Note that the design of the control gains in (5)-(6) is not addressed in this paper. We assume here that these gains have already been designed appropriately to guarantee synchronization in the absence of attacks, and instead analyze the effect of attacks on the network performance and propose mitigation methods. Still, we briefly discuss below a solution to Problem 1 as provided in [34] . To solve Problem 1, the controller u i in (6) and the local neighborhood tracking error in (7) are given in [34] as
where ζ i evolves according to (5) and K i1 is designed such that A i + B i K i1 is Hurwitz and, Π i and Γ i1 are solutions to the following linear matrix equations
where S and R are defined in (2) . Necessary and sufficient condition for solving Problem 1 is the existence of a solution to (9) [34] .
Remark 4. The general control protocol (5)-(6) covers many of the existing control protocols for multi-agent CPSs with possibly different forms of data exchange. For instance, in [34] , [40] , data exchanged in (7) is considered as the internal state of the controller, i.e., h j = ζ j . In [38] , for the case of leader-follower systems, the relative output measurement is exchanged among agents and, therefore, h j = y j . Moreover, homogeneous multi-agent CPSs can also be modeled as (5) , which is the main equation for attack analysis and detection, as to be shown later. Note that, for a homogeneous system, one has A i = S , B i = B and C i = R for all i = 1, . . . , N, and thus the dynamics of agent i becomes
The controller is designed as u i = cK j∈N i a i j x j − x i [41] , and thus the dynamics of an agent combined with its controller reduces toẋ
which is the same as (5) with ζ i replaced with the state of the agent, i.e., x i , µ = cBK and h i = x i in (7) [31] , [41] .
Remark 5. In the presence of communication noise, the local neighborhood tracking error (7) for agent i becomes
where ω i ∼ N(0, Σ ω i ) denotes the aggregate Gaussian noise affecting the incoming information to agent i and is given as
with ω i j the incoming communication noise from agent j to agent i. In such situations, although agents cannot reach exact synchronization, the expected value of the synchronization error converges to zero with a variance depending on the variance of ω i (i.e., it depends on the statistical properties of the noise).
We now argue that we can take equation (5) as the main one in our analysis and mitigation. This is because, y i − y j → 0 if and only if ζ i − ζ j → 0. Therefore, if the discrepancy between agents' internal states in (5) does not vanish, they will not reach synchronization. This is obvious for the case of homogeneous multi-agent CPSs (see (11) ) for which h i = x i . It is also evident for the case of leader-follower systems with h i = y i . For the case in which h i = ζ i , the following theorem proves this fact. Therefore, in the rest of the paper, most of our analysis is performed on analyzing the effect of attack on (5) and it is also assumed that h i = ζ i for simplicity. Lemma 2. [42] Consider the following systeṁ
where x ∈ R n , F ∈ R n×n is Hurwitz, ε > 0 and f 1 (t) ∈ R n is bounded and continuous for all t 0. Then, x(t) → 0 as t → ∞ if and only if f 1 (t) → 0 as t → ∞ (exponentially), for any x(t 0 ) and ε > 0.
Theorem 1. Consider the multi-agent CPS (1)-(2) with the controller (5)- (7) . Then, y i − y j → 0 if and only if ζ i − ζ j → 0.
Proof. Note that for heterogeneous agents, the controller (6) reduces to (8)- (9) , as stated in Remark 2. It was shown in [34] that agents reach output synchronization if and only if (9) . To proceed, define the tracking error as φ i = x i − Π i ζ i . With the aid of (1), (5)- (7) and (8)- (9) , the dynamics of tracking error φ i can be written asφ
To guarantee synchronization, the tracking error (15) should converge to zero asymptotically. As shown in [34] 
This proves the sufficient condition, and therefore completes the proof.
IV. ATTACK MODELLING AND ANALYSIS
In this section, CPS attacks on agents are modelled and a complete attack analysis is performed.
A. Attack Modelling
In this subsection, attacks on multi-agent CPSs are modelled. Generally, the attacker injects a disrupted signal to corrupt the data exchanged among agents. Since in the control protocol (5)-(6) for the multi-agent CPS (1)-(2), only h i in (7) is exchanged among agents, direct attacks on agent i can be modelled as
where h i , h d i and h c i denote, respectively, the nominal values of the exchanged information in (7) , the disrupted signal injected into agent i, and the corrupted value of the transmitted information of agent i. If agent i is under attack, α i = 1, otherwise α i = 0. Agent i could also be affected by attacks indirectly, e.g., receiving corrupted information from its neighbors. To model the overall attack on agent i, using (16) and (7), (5) becomesζ
where f i = j∈N i a i j α j h d j is the overall attack affecting the agent i. If the exchanged information is the internal state of the controller, i.e., h j = ζ j in (7), then one has
with ζ d j the attack signal on the outgoing communication link of agent j. Definition 7 (IMP-based and non-IMP-based Attacks). Let the attack signal f in (17) be generated bẏ
where Ψ ∈ R k×k denotes the dynamics of the attack signal.
where λ i (Ψ) ∀i = 1, . . . , k and λ i (S ) ∀i = 1, . . . , q are, respectively, the set of eigenvalues of the attack signal generator dynamics matrix Ψ and the consensus dynamics matrix S , respectively. Then, if E Ψ ⊆ E S , the attack signal is called the internal model principle (IMP)-based attack. Otherwise, i.e., E Ψ E S or if the attacker has no dynamics (e.g. a random signal), it is called a non-IMP based attack. Remark 6. Note that we do not impose any limitations on the attack signal. Attacks are placed into two classes in Definition 7 based on their impact on the system performance, as to be shown in the subsequent sections. The non-IMP based attacks cover a broad range of attacks. Based on (17), the global form of the controller (5)-(6) under attack can be written as
where ε is the overall disrupted disagreement among agents,
where f = [ f T 1 , . . . , f T N ] T is the overall vector of attacks on agents and L is the graph Laplacian matrix. Moreover,
. . , x T N ] T are, respectively, the global vectors of the control inputs, the internal states of the controller and the states of agents, and K = diag(K 1 , . . . , K N ), Γ = diag(Γ 1 , . . . , Γ N ).
B. Attack Analysis
In this subsection, a graph theoretic-based approach is utilized to analyze the effect of attacks on the output synchronization of heterogeneous multi-agent CPSs. To this end, the following definitions and lemmas are used.
Let the graph Laplacian matrix L be partitioned as
where r and nr in (23) denote, respectively, the number of root nodes and non-root nodes. Moreover, L r×r and L nr×nr are, respectively, the sub-graph matrices corresponding to the sub-graphs of root nodes and non-root nodes. Lemma 3. Consider the partitioned graph Laplacian matrix (23) . Then, L r×r is a singular M-matrix and L nr×nr is a nonsingular M-matrix.
Proof. We first prove that the subgraph of root nodes is strongly connected. According to the definition of a root node, there always exists a directed path from a root node to all other nodes of the graph G, including other root nodes. Therefore, in the graph G, there always exists a path from each root node to all other root nodes. We now show that removing nonroot nodes from the graph G does not affect the connectivity of the subgraph comprised of only root nodes. In the graph G, if a non-root node is not an incoming neighbor of a root node, then its removal does not harm the connectivity of the subgraph of the root nodes. Suppose that removing a non-root node affects the connectivity of the subgraph of root nodes. This requires the non-root node to be an incoming neighbor of a root node. However, this makes the removed node a root node, as it can now access all other nodes through the root node it is connected to. Hence, this argument shows that the subgraph of root nodes is always strongly connected. Then, L r×r , has zero as one of its eigenvalues, which implies that L r×r is a singular M-matrix according to Definition 3. On the other hand, from (23), since L is a lower triangular matrix, the eigenvalues of L are the union of the eigenvalues of L r×r and L nr×nr . Moreover, as stated in Lemma 1, L has a simple zero eigenvalue and, as shown above, zero is the eigenvalue of L r×r . Therefore, all eigenvalues of L nr×nr have positive real parts, and thus based on Definition 4, L nr×nr is a non-singular M-matrix.
Lemma 4. Consider the multi-agent CPS (1)-(2) under attack with the controller (6), (17) . Assume that
with f (t) defined in (22) as the overall attack. Then, ζ i ∀i reaches a steady state, i.e.,ζ i → S ζ i as t → ∞. Moreover, the agents' states also reach a steady state given by
for some δ ik ∈ R n i , with λ k (S ) the eigenvalues of S in the consensus dynamics (2) .
Proof. From the global dynamics of the controller (21), the disrupted disagreement ε in (22) vanishes and, consequently, the internal state of the controller ζ reaches a steady state, i.e.,
On the other hand, when the disagreement in (22) vanishes, i.e., ε → 0, then using (1) with the dynamic controller in (21) , one can write the state of agent i as
Since K i is designed such that A c becomes Hurwitz [34] , as t → ∞, then using modal decomposition one gets (25) . This completes the proof.
Remark 7. The condition (24) plays an important role in the analysis to follow. We will show that if this condition is violated, an IMP-based attack can make the entire system unstable. On the other hand, if this condition is satisfied, an IMP-based attack makes agents reach a steady state with zero local neighborhood tracking error, while they are far from synchronization. Conditions under which the local neighborhood tracking error of agents does not converge to zero in the presence of the attack are also found based on (24) . These results are then used to detect and mitigate both IMP-based and non-IMP based attacks in the subsequent sections. Corollary 1. If condition (24) is not satisfied, then agents do not reach a steady state as long as the attack signal is nonzero.
Proof. The proof follows Lemma 4.
Lemma 5. Consider the multi-agent CPS (1)-(2) along with the controller (6), (17), under a non-IMP based attack. Then, (24) cannot be satisfied.
Proof. We prove this result by contradiction.
, which implies that there exists a nonzero bounded vector ζ such that −L ⊗ I q ζ + f (t) → 0. This then says that the internal state of the controller (21) reaches a steady state and thusζ i → S ζ i for all i = 1, . . . , N. Using the modal decomposition, one has
where r j and m j denote, respectively, the left and right eigenvectors associated with the eigenvalue λ j (S ). On the other
for all i = 1, . . . , N. As shown in (27) , the left-hand side of (28) is generated by the natural modes of the consensus dynamics whereas the right-hand side is generated by the natural modes of the attack signal generator dynamics in (19) . By the prior assumption, E Ψ E S , the attacker's natural modes are different from those of the consensus dynamics. Therefore, (28) cannot be satisfied which contradicts the assumption. This completes the proof.
Note that for notational simplicity, we use f ∈ Im(L ⊗ I q ) throughout the paper, in place of f (t) ∈ Im(L ⊗ I q ) ∀ t > 0. Lemma 6. Consider the multi-agent CPS (1)-(2) along with the controller (6), (17) , where the attack signal f is injected (20) , then, f ∈ Im(L ⊗ I q ).
Proof. It was shown in Lemma 4 that if f ∈ Im(L ⊗ I q ), then agents reach a steady state. That is,ζ s → (I N ⊗ S ) ζ s , where ζ s can be represented as the steady state of the internal state of all agents. This implies that ζ
where r j and m j denote, respectively, the left and right eigenvectors associated with the eigenvalue λ j (S ) of the consensus dynamics matrix S . Define ζ s = [ζ T rs ,ζ T nrs ] T , whereζ rs andζ nrs are, respectively, the global steady states of root nodes and non-root nodes. Using (23) and f ∈ Im(L ⊗ I q ), one has
wheref nr = [ f T r+1 , . . . , f T N ] T represents the attack on non-root nodes. As stated in Lemma 3, L r×r is a singular M-matrix with zero as an eigenvalue and 1 r is its corresponding right eigenvector and, thus, the solution to the first equation of (29) becomesζ rs = c 1 1 r . Therefore, from (29) , the global vector of the steady state value of non-root nodes can be written as
for some positive scalar c 1 . Based on Lemma 3, L nr×nr is a non-singular M-matrix and this implies that (30) always has a solution. However, it was shown in Lemma 5 that if E Ψ E S , then condition in (24) cannot be satisfied. Therefore, one can conclude that for any f = [0 r ,f T nr ] T , there exists a solution ζ s such that f ∈ Im(L ⊗ I q ) if and only if E Ψ ⊆ E S . This completes the proof.
The following theorem provides necessary and sufficient conditions for IMP-based attacks to assure f ∈ Im(L ⊗ I q ). where p k are the nonzero elements of the left eigenvector of the graph Laplacian matrix L associated with its zero eigenvalue.
Proof. It was shown in the Lemma 6 that for the IMP-based attacks on non-root nodes, i.e., f = [0 r ,f T nr ] T , f ∈ Im(L ⊗ I q ) regardless off nr . Therefore, whether f ∈ Im(L⊗I q ) is satisfied or not depends solely upon attacks on root nodes, i.e.,f r = [ f T 1 , . . . , f T r ] T . Now, we first prove the necessary condition for root nodes. If f ∈ Im(L ⊗ I q ), then, using (23), there exists a nonzero vectorζ rs for root nodes such that
whereζ rs can be considered as the global steady state of the root nodes. Moreover, based on Lemma 5, (32) holds, if and only if E Ψ ⊆ E S . As stated in Lemma 3, L r×r is a strongly connected graph of root nodes and, therefore, it is a singular M-matrix. Letw T = [p 1 , . . . , p r ] be the left eigenvector associated with the zero eigenvalue of L r×r . Now, pre-multiplying both sides of (32) byw T and using the fact thatw T L r×r = 0 yield
This states that IMP-based attacks on root nodes have to satisfy N k=1 p k f k = 0 to guarantee f ∈ Im(L ⊗ I q ). Note that p k = 0 for k = r + 1, . . . , N, i.e., the elements of the left eigenvector of the graph Laplacian matrix L, corresponding to its zero eigenvalue, are zero for non-root nodes [41] , [43] . This proves the necessity part. Now, we prove the sufficient part by contradiction for root
nodes. Assume f ∈ Im(L ⊗ I q ), but N k=1 p k f k 0. Note that, f ∈ Im(L ⊗ I q ) implies that there exists a nonzero vectorζ rs such that (32) holds. Using (33) and N k=1 p k f k 0, one can conclude thatw T (L r×r ⊗I q )ζ rs 0. This can happen only when L r×r does not have any zero eigenvalue, which violates the fact in Lemma 3 that L r×r is a strongly connected graph. Therefore,w T (L r×r ⊗ I q )ζ rs = 0 which results in N k=1 p k f k = 0 and contradicts the assumption made. This completes the proof.
Theorem 3. Consider the multi-agent CPS (1)-(2) along with the controller (6), (17) , and assume that attacks are on root nodes. Then, the output of all agents diverge to infinity, i.e., y i → ∞ ∀i = 1, . . . , N, if and only if E Ψ ∩ E S ∅ and (24) is not satisfied.
Proof. Since it is assumed that the condition in (24) is not satisfied, the disrupted disagreement ε in (22) and, consequently, the attack signal f does not vanish over time based on Corollary 1 and eventually acts as an input to the internal state of the dynamic controller (21) . Assume that there exists at least one common eigenvalue between the consensus dynamics matrix S in (2) and the attacker dynamics matrix Ψ in (19), i.e., E Ψ ∩ E S ∅. Based on Assumption 2, the consensus dynamics is marginally stable and since the attacker dynamics has common eigenvalues with the consensus dynamics, the multiplicity of at least one marginally stable pole becomes greater than 1. Therefore, the attacker destabilizes the internal state of the dynamic controller u in (21) . Moreover, since the attack is on root nodes, and root nodes have a path to all other nodes in the network, the internal state of the controller of all agents converge to infinity as t → ∞. This results in an unbounded control input u in (21) for all agents which makes the state and, thereby, the output of all agents unstable as t → ∞. This completes the proof.
Note that in Theorem 3, even if f (t) ∈ Im(L ⊗ I q ) only for a finite time 0 < t < t f with t f sufficiently large, the agent's state will significantly grow, as the entire network is unstable, and the agents cannot recover.
Remark 8. For the case of IMP-based attacks, i.e., E Ψ ⊆ E S , the condition E Ψ ∩ E S ∅ is always satisfied. Moreover, f ∈ Im(L ⊗ I q ) does not hold if condition (31) is not satisfied. Therefore, for an IMP-based attack, the output of all agents tend to infinity only if condition (31) is not satisfied.
Theorem 4 below now shows that despite IMP-based attacks, if f ∈ Im(L ⊗ I q ), the local neighborhood tracking error (7) converges to zero for intact agents that have a path to the compromised agent, while they do not synchronize.
Theorem 4. Consider the multi-agent CPS (1)-(2) along with the controller (6), (17) . Then, the local neighborhood tracking error (7) converges to zero for all intact agents if and only if f ∈ Im(L ⊗ I q ). Moreover, intact agents that are reachable from the compromised agents do not converge to the desired consensus trajectory.
Proof. In the presence of attacks, the global form of the internal state of the dynamic controller (17) can be written asζ
where ζ = ζ T 1 , . . . , ζ T N T is the global vector of the internal state of agents, η = η T 1 , . . . , η T N T is the global vector of the local neighborhood tracking error (7) and f = f T 1 , . . . , f T N T denotes the global vector of attacks. It was shown in Lemma 4 that if f ∈ Im(L ⊗ I q ), agents reach a steady state, i.e., η + f → 0. That is,
∀ agents i = 1, . . . , N. For the intact agent, by definition one has f i = 0, and thus (35) implies that the local neighborhood tracking error (7) converges to zero. Now, we show that intact agents which are reachable from the compromised agent do not synchronize to the desired consensus. To do this, let agent j be under attack. Assuming that all intact agents synchronize, one has ζ k = ζ i ∀i, k ∈ {1, . . . N} − { j}. Now, consider the intact agent i as an immediate neighbor of the compromised agent j. Then, from f ∈ Im(L ⊗ I q ), for intact agent i, i.e., f i = 0, one has
where ζ k denotes the internal state of the dynamic controller of all intact neighbors of agent i. On the other hand, (17) shows that the internal state of the dynamic controller of the compromised agent j, i.e., ζ j , is deviated from the desired value with a value proportional to f j . Therefore, (36) results in deviating the internal state of the dynamic controller of the immediate neighbor of the compromised agent j from the consensus trajectory, which contradicts the assumption. Consequently, intact agents that have a path to the compromised agent do not reach consensus, while their local neighborhood tracking error is zero. This completes the proof.
Remark 9. The effects of an attacker on a network of agents depend upon the dynamics of the attack signal. As stated in Theorem 3, to destabilize the entire network, the attack signal requires access to at least one common eigenvalue with the consensus dynamics. To this end, an attacker can exploit the security of the network by eavesdropping and monitoring the transmitted data to identify at least one of the eigenvalues of the agent dynamics, and then launch a signal with the same frequency to a root node to make the output synchronization error go to infinity.
Remark 10. All results can be extended for the case when there exists communication noise on the incoming links as introduced in (12) and (13) . In such a situation, the output synchronization problem changes to the problem of mean square consensus of output synchronization error as lim t→∞ E e i (t) 2 = 0 ∀i = 1, . . . , N
Moreover, the steady state of the internal state of the dynamic controller of each agent changes into the noisy steady state aṡ
and the noisy steady state of agents can be represented as
for some δ ik andδ i j using modal decomposition. Moreover, λ k (S ) is the eigenvalue of the consensus dynamics matrix S in (2) . This implies that agents converge to a consensus trajectory which is affected by the communication noise and, therefore, its mean and variance depend upon the mean and variance of the communication noise. Moreover, from (12) and (38) , the local neighborhood tracking error for each agent also converges to the mean and variance of the incoming communication noise. Therefore, one can show that an IMPbased attack does not change the statistical properties of the local neighborhood tracking error, while a non-IMP based attack does.
In the next section, attack detection and mitigation mechanisms are proposed for both IMP-based and non-IMP based attacks. To this end, it is assumed that the communication network is noisy.
V. AN ATTACK DETECTION MECHANISM
In this section, Kullback-Liebler (KL)-based attack detection and mitigation approaches are developed for both IMPbased and non-IMP-based attacks.
The KL divergence is a non-negative measure of the relative entropy between two probability distributions [44] , [45] which is defined as follows. Definition 8 (KL divergence) [44] , [45] . Let X and Z be two random sequences with probability density functions P X and P Z , respectively. The KL divergence measure between P X and P Z is defined as
with the following properties [44]: 1) D KL (P X ||P z ) 0 2) D KL (P X ||P z ) = 0 if and only if, P X = P z 3) D KL (P X ||P z ) D KL (P z ||P X ) In the following subsections, KL-divergence is used to detect IMP-based and non-IMP-based attacks on heterogeneous multi-agent CPSs.
A. Attack detection for IMP-based attacks
In this subsection, an attack detector is designed to identify IMP-based attacks. To this end, two error sequences τ i and ϕ i are defined based on only local exchanged information for agent i as
and
where ω i and ω i j are defined in (13) and f d i = j∈N i a i j f d j . In fact, (41) is the norm of the summation of the discrepancy of agent i and all its neighbors, and (42) is the summation of norms of those discrepancies. In the absence of attack, these two signals show the same behavior in the sense that their means converge to zero.
In the presence of an IMP-based attack and in the absence of noise, based on Theorem 4, τ i goes to zero, despite attack. However, it is obvious that ϕ i does not converge to zero in the presence of an attack. In the presence of noise, the statistical properties of τ i converge to the statistical properties of the noise. In contrast, the statistical properties of ϕ i depend upon not only the statistical properties of the noise signal, but also of the attack signal. Therefore, the behavior of these two signals significantly diverges in the presence of attacks and can be captured by KL-divergence methods. Existing KL-divergence methods are, nevertheless, developed for Gaussian signals. However, while the communication noise is assumed to be Gaussian, error sequences (41) and (42) are norms of some variable with Gaussian distributions, thus, they have univariate folded Gaussian distributions given by [30] ϕ i ∼ F N(µ 1i , σ 2 1i ) and τ i ∼ F N(µ 2i , σ 2 2i ) . That is,
where µ 1i and σ 1i are the mean and variance of the error sequences ϕ i and µ 2i and σ 2i are the mean and variance of the error sequences τ i . Using (40) , the KL divergence in terms of the local error sequences ϕ i and τ i can be defined as
represents the expectation value with respect to the distribution of the first sequence.
A KL divergence formula for the folded Gaussian distributions is now developed in the following lemma. Lemma 7. Consider the error sequences τ i and ϕ i in (41)-(42) with folded Gaussian distributions P ϕ i and P τ i in (43) . Then, the KL divergence between error sequences τ i and ϕ i , i.e., D KL (ϕ i ||τ i ), becomes
In the following theorem, we show that the effect of IMPbased attacks can be captured using the KL divergence defined in (45) .
Theorem 5. Consider the multi-agent CPS (1)-(2) along with the controller (6), (17) , and under the IMP-based attacks. Assume that the communication noise sequences are i.i.d. Then, for a reachable intact agent i,
where ϕ i and τ i are defined in (41) and (42), respectively, and T and γ i represent the window size and the predesigned threshold parameter.
Proof. According to Theorem 4, the local neighborhood tracking error goes to zero for intact agents in the presence of an IMP-based attack when there is no communication noise. In the presence of communication noise with Gaussian distribution, i.e., ω i ∼ (0, Σ ω i ) and IMP-based attack, the expectation value of the local neighborhood tracking error becomes
Using (47), one can write (41) as
which represents a folded Gaussian distribution with mean zero and varianceῡ 2 ωi . Note that the mean and variance of the distribution in (41) become µ 2i = 0 and σ 2 2i =ῡ 2 ωi . Since noise signals are independent and identically distributed, from (42) , one can infer that the folded Gaussian distribution P ϕ i has the following statistical properties
represent the overall mean and covariance due to the communication noise and overall deviation from the desired behavior in intact neighbors reachable from the compromised agent.
In the absence of attack, the statistical properties corresponding to sequences τ i and ϕ i become F N(0,ῡ 2 ωi ) and F N(0,ῡ 2 ωi +υ 2 ω i ) , respectively, and the corresponding KL divergence in (45) becomes
whereυ 2 ω i represents additional variance in sequence ϕ i , which depends on the communication noise. Now, in the presence of IMP-based attacks, using the derived form of KL divergence for folded Gaussian distributions from Lemma 7, one can simplify (45) using (48)-(49) as
Then, one can design the threshold parameter γ i such that
where T denotes the sliding window size. This completes the proof.
Based on Theorem 5, one can use the following conditions for attack detection.
where γ i denotes the designed threshold for detection, the null hypotheses H 0 represents the intact mode and H 1 denotes the compromised mode of an agent.
B. Attack detection for non-IMP-based attacks
This subsection presents the design of a KL-based attack detector for non-IMP based attacks.
It was shown in Theorem 4 that the local neighborhood tracking error goes to zero if and only if agents are under IMP-based attacks. Therefore, for the case of non-IMP-based attacks, one can identify these types of attacks using the changes in the statistical properties of the local neighborhood tracking error. In the absence of attack, since the Gaussian noise, i.e., ω i ∼ N(0, Σ ω i ), is considered in the communication link, the local neighborhood tracking error η i in (12) has the following statistical properties
and it represents the nominal behavior of the system. In the presence of attacks, using (12) , the local neighborhood tracking error η a i can be written as
where f i = j∈N i a i j f d j denotes overall deviation in incoming information from neighbors due to the attacks in the network. From (55), one has
where µ f i and Σ f i are, respectively, mean and covariance of the overall deviation due to the attacks. Now, since both η a i and η i have normal Gaussian distributions, the KL divergence in the terms of η a i and η i as D KL (η a i ||η i ) can be written as [46] 
where µ η i and Σ η i denote the mean and covariance of η i and µ η a i and Σ η a i denote the mean and covariance of η a i . Moreover, n denotes the dimension of the error sequence. Define the average of KL divergence over a window T as
The following theorem says that the effect of non-IMP based attacks can be detected using the KL divergence between the two error sequences η a i and η i . Theorem 6. Consider the multi-agent CPS (1)-(2) along with the controller (6), (17) . Then, 1) in the absence of any attack,D i defined in (58) tends to zero. 2) in the presence of a non-IMP-based attack,D i defined in (58) is greater than a predefined threshold γ i .
Proof. In the absence of attacks, the statistical properties of sequences η i and η a i are the same as in (54). Therefore, the KL divergence D KL (η a i ||η i ) in (57) becomes zero and this makes D i in (58) zero. This completes the proof of part 1.
To prove Part 2, the mean of the local neighborhood tracking error (55) under attacks becomes
where ω i ∼ N(0, Σ ω i ) is defined in (13) . Using (54)-(56) in (57) and the fact that (Σ −1
, the KL divergence between η a i and η i becomes
Then, using (58), one has
(61) where T and γ i denote the sliding window size and the predefined design threshold, respectively. This completes the proof.
Based on Theorem 6, one can use the following conditions for attack detection:
where γ i denotes the designed threshold for detection, the null hypotheses H 0 represents the intact mode of the system and H 1 denotes the compromised mode of the system. In the next section, Theorems 5 and 6 are employed to propose an attack mitigation approach which enables us to mitigate both IMP-based attacks and non-IMP-based attacks.
VI. AN ATTACK MITIGATION MECHANISM
In this section, both IMP-based and non-IMP-based attacks are mitigated using the proposed KL-based detectors developed in the previous section.
A. Self-belief of agents about their outgoing information
To determine the level of trustworthiness of each agent about its own information, a self-belief value is presented. If an agent detects an attack, it reduces its level of trustworthiness about its own understanding of the environment and communicates it with its neighbors to inform them about the significance of its outgoing information and thus slow down the attack propagation.
For the IMP-based attacks, using the D KL (ϕ i ||τ i ) from Theorem 5, we define C 1 i (t) as
where ∆ i represents the threshold to account for the channel fading and other uncertainties and κ 1 > 0 denotes the discount factor. Equation (63) can be implemented by the following differential equationĊ
According to Theorem 5, in the presence of IMP-based attacks, D KL (ϕ i ||τ i ) increases, which makes χ 1 i (t) approach zero and consequently makes the value of C 1 i (t) close to zero. On the other hand, without an attack, D KL (ϕ i ||τ i ) tends to zero, making χ 1 i (t) approach 1 and, consequently, C 1 i (t) becomes close to 1. The larger the value of C 1 i (t) is, the more confident the agent is about the trustworthiness of its broadcasted information.
Similarly, for the non-IMP-based attacks, using the D KL (η a i ||η i ) from Theorem 6, we define C 2 i (t) as
where 0 C 2 i (t) 1 with
where ∆ i represents the threshold to account for the channel fading and other uncertainties, and κ 2 > 0 denotes the discount factor. Expression (65) can be generated bẏ
Using Theorem 6 and the same argument as we employed for C 1 i (t), one can show that C 2 i (t) is close to 1 in the absence of an attack, and close to zero in the presence of a non-IMP based attack.
Then, using C 1 i (t) and C 2 i (t) defined in (63) and (65), the self-belief of an agent i for both IMP and non-IMP-based attacks is defined as
If an agent is reachable from a compromised agent under IMP or non-IMP based attack, its self-belief tends to zero. In such a situation, it sends the low self-belief value to its neighbor to put less weight on the information they receive from it and this prevents attacks from propagating.
B. Trust of agents about their incoming information
The trust value represents the level of confidence of an agent on its neighbors' information. If the self-belief value of an agent is low, it forms beliefs on its neighbors (either intact or compromised) and updates its trust value which depends on the beliefs on each of its neighbors using only local information. Therefore, agents identify the compromised neighbor and discard its information.
Using the KL divergence between exchanged information of agent i and its neighbor, one can define η i j (t) as
with m i = j∈N i h j and Λ 1 , Λ 2 > 0 represent the threshold to account for channel fading and other uncertainties, and κ 3 > 0 denotes the discount factor. For the compromised neighbor, the KL divergence D KL (h j ||m i ) tends to zero, which makes L i j (t) close to zero. Consequently, this makes the value of η i j (t) close to zero. On the other hand, if the incoming neighbor is not compromised, then D KL (h j ||m i ) increases and makes η i j (t) approach 1. Equation (68) can be implemented using the following differential equatioṅ
Now, we define the trust value of an agent on its neighbors as Ω i j (t) = max(C i (t), η i j (t)) (70) with 0 Ω i j (t) 1.
In the absence of attacks, the state of agents converge to the consensus trajectory and the KL divergence D KL (h j ||m i ), ∀ j ∈ N i tends to zero which results in Ω i j (t) being 1 ∀ j ∈ N i . In the presence of attacks, η i j (t) corresponding to the compromised agents tends to zero.
C. The mitigation mechanism using trust and self-belief values
In this subsection, the trust and self-belief values are utilized to design the mitigation algorithm. To this end, both self-belief and trust values are incorporated into the exchange information among agents. Consequently, the local neighborhood tracking error (12) is modified as
where Ω i j (t) and C j (t) denote, respectively, the trust value and the self-belief of neighboring agents. Remark 11. The proposed approach discards the compromised agent only when an attack is detected, in contrast to most of the existing methods that are based on solely the discrepancy among agents. Note that discrepancy can be the result of a legitimate change in the state of one agent. Moreover, in the beginning of synchronization, there could be a huge discrepancy between agents' states that should not be discarded. Proof. The dynamics (5) of the internal state of the controller using the proposed local neighborhood tracking error (71) can be written asζ
with the global form aṡ
where L(t) denotes the time varying graph Laplacian matrix of the directed graph G(t). Assumption 3 implies that the total number of the compromised agents is assumed less than half of the network connectivity, i.e., 2q + 1. Therefore, even if q neighbors of an intact agent are attacked and collude to send the same value to misguide it, there still exists q + 1 intact neighbors that communicate values different from the compromised ones. Moreover, since at least half of the intact agent's neighbors are intact, it can update its trust values to remove the compromised neighbors. Furthermore, since the time varying graph G(t) resulting from isolating the compromised agents is 1-robust, based on Definition 6 and Lemma 8, the entire network is still connected to the intact agents. Therefore, there exists a spanning tree in the graph associated with all intact agents. Under this assumption, it is shown in [47] that all the solutions of (72) synchronize to the systemζ 0 = S ζ 0 uniformly exponentially. This results in ζ j − ζ i → 0 as t → ∞. This completes the proof.
VII. SIMULATION RESULTS
In this section, an example is provided to illustrate the effectiveness of the proposed detection and mitigation approaches. Consider a group of 5 heterogeneous agents with the dynamics defined as
where 1, 1, 0} , {10, 2, 1, 0} , {2, 1, 1, 10} , {2, 1, 1, 1} and {5, 1, 1, 2}. The communication graph is shown in Fig. 1 . Let the consensus dynamics matrices in (2) be picked as
Using (9), the control gains can be obtained as
Moreover, the feedback gain K k is designed using the associated algebraic Riccati equation (ARE) such that A k + B k K k becomes Hurwitz for all k = 1, . . . , 5. In the absence of an attack, agents reach output synchronization and there emerges the healthy behavior of the system with noisy communication as shown in Fig. 2 .
A. IMP-based attacks
This subsection analyzes the effects of IMP-based attacks and illustrates our attack detection and mitigation scheme. The attack signal is assumed to be f = 10 sin(t). This is an IMPbased attack and is assumed to be launched on Agent 1 (root node) at time t=20. The results are shown in Fig. 3 . It can be seen that the compromised agent destabilizes the entire network. This result is consistent with Theorem 3. It is shown in Fig. 4 that the same IMP-based attack on Agent 5 (noon-root node) cannot destabilize the entire network. However, Agent 4, which is the only agent reachable from Agent 5, does not synchronize to the desired consensus trajectory. Moreover, one can see that the local neighborhood tracking error converges to zero for all intact agents except the compromised Agent 5. These results are in line with Theorem 4. Then, the effect of attack is rejected using the presented detection and mitigation approach in Theorem 5 and Theorem 7. Fig.5 shows that reachable agents follow the desired consensus trajectory, even in the presence of the attack. 
B. Non-IMP-based attacks
This subsection analyzes the effects of non-IMP-based attacks and validates our attack detection and mitigation approach. The attack signal is assumed to be f = 20 + 10 sin(4t). The effect of this non-IMP-based attack on Agent 5 (non-root node) is shown in Fig.6 . It can be seen that this non-IMPbased attack on Agent 5 only affects the reachable Agent 4. It is shown in Fig.7 that the effect of the attack is removed for the intact Agent 4 using detection and mitigation approaches presented in Theorems 6 and 7.
VIII. CONCLUSION
A resilient control framework has been introduced for multi-agent CPSs. First, the effects of IMP-based and non-IMP-based attacks on multi-agent CPSs have been analyzed using a graph-theoretic approach. Then, a KL divergence based criterion, using only the observed local information of agents, has been employed to detect attacks. Each agent detects its neighbors' misbehaviors, consequently forming a self-belief about the correctness of its own information, and continuously updates its self-belief and communicates it with its neighbors to inform them about the significance of its outgoing information. Additionally, if the self-belief value of an agent is low, it forms beliefs on the type of its neighbors (intact or compromised) and, consequently, updates its trust of its neighbors. Finally, agents incorporate their neighbors' selfbeliefs and their own trust values in their control protocols to slow down and mitigate attacks.
A possible direction for future work is to extend these results to synchronization of multi-agent CPSs with nonlinear dynamics. Since nonlinear systems can exhibit finite-time escape behavior, a problem of interest is to find the conditions under which the attacker can make the trajectories of agents become unbounded in finite time, and to obtain detection and mitigation mechanisms to counteract such attacks fast and thus avoid instability.
Appendix A PROOF OF LEMMA 7
Using (45) , the KL divergence between error sequences ϕ i and τ i can be written as
where probability density functions P ϕ i and P τ i are defined in (43) . Using (43) , (77) becomes
By the aid of the logarithm property as log(a + b) = log(a) + log(1 + b/a), (78) turns into
The first term in (79) is a KL divergence formula for statistical sequences with normal Gaussian distribution which is given in [46] as
The second term T 2 in (79), using power series expansion log(1 + a) = n 0 (−1) n a n+1 (n + 1) and ignoring higher order terms, can be approximated as where ρ 1 = (µ 1i − 2µ 2i σ 2 1i σ −2 2i ) and ρ 2 = (µ 1i + 2µ 2i σ 2 1i σ −2 2i ) which becomes
Similarly, the last term of T 2 can be simplified as
where ρ 3 = (µ 1i − 4µ 2i σ 2 1i σ −2 2i ) and ρ 4 = (µ 1i + 4µ 2i σ 2 1i σ −2 2i ) . Adding (84), (86), (89) and (90), T 2 can be written as 
